REFLECTIONS

UPON

LIBERTY

AND

NECESSITY, &c.

He who ſhould attempt to ſhift theſe ſcenes of airy viſion for thoſe of real knowledge, might expect to be treated with ſcorn and anger by the whole theological and metaphyſical tribe, the maſters and the ſcholars. He would be deſpiſed as a plebeian philoſopher, and railed at as an infidel; it would be ſounded high that he debaſed human nature... In ſuch clamour as this the voice of truth and reaſon would be drowned, and with both of them on his ſide, he who oppoſed it would make many enemies and few converts. Nay, I am apt to think that ſome of theſe, if he made any, would ſay to him as ſoon as the gaudy viſions of error were diſpelled, and till they were accuſtomed to the ſimplicity of truth, *Pol me occidiſtis.*

Lord BOLINGBROKE.

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PREFACE.

THE following pages are the productions of the idle hours of one who meaneth not to dictate, but merely to deliver his own ſentiments and opinions upon ſeveral ſubjects uſually eſteemed to be of the greateſt importance; whether theſe ſentiments and opinions coincide or not with thoſe of any other perſon living or dead, is a matter of the utmoſt indifference to him. No copy of them ſhall, with his conſent, be ſold; which circumſtance, added to their own inſignificance, makes it very unlikely that his ſuperiors in parts and learning ſhould honour them with any kind of cenſure or animadverſion: but the writer of them muſt fairly acknowledge, that if ſo improbable an event ſhould happen, it would give him the utmoſt ſatisfaction and pleaſure.

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26 SE 60

LIBERTY

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

I HAVE read OCHINUS's famous Labyrinth, JAQUELOT's *Conformité de la Foy avec la Raiſon*, Mr LOCKE's chapter on *Power*, both in the firſt and in a ſubſequent edition, Dr CLARKE's Anſwer to Mr COLLINS on *Human Liberty*, Mr LEIBNITZ's treatiſe on the ſame ſubject, intitled, *Theodicée*, and likewiſe what my Lord BOLINGBROKE has ſaid on this ſubject in ſeveral parts of his *Philoſophical Works*, and to my great ſurprize have not met with a ſingle argument of the leaſt weight, as it appeareth to me, to prove that Man is a free agent; equivocal terms, begging the queſtion, and

changing the ſtate of the queſtion in various manners, and particularly by flying to arguments drawn, or pretended to be drawn, from conſequences, together with a few more ſubterfuges of the like nature, ſeem to be the only ſupports on which the maintainers of human liberty reſt the merits of their cauſe.

Mr Locke in his anſwer to the Biſhop of *Worceſter*, as it ſtands quoted in the tenth edition of his *Eſſay*, Vol. II. Page 165, 166. has the ſubſequent paſſage, *viz.* "But your "Lordſhip, as I gueſs by your following "words, would argue that a material ſub-"ſtance cannot be a free agent; whereby I "ſuppoſe you only mean that you cannot "conceive, or ſee, how a ſolid ſubſtance "ſhould begin, ſtop, or change, its own "motion. To which give me leave to an-"ſwer, that when you can make it conceiv-"able how any finite, created, dependent "ſubſtance can move itſelf, or alter, or ſtop "its own motion, which it muſt (be able "to do) to be a free agent, I ſuppoſe you "will find it no harder for God to beſtow "this power on a ſolid than on an unſolid "created ſubſtance.— In the preſent caſe

"God

" God having revealed that there ſhall be " a day of judgment, I think * that is foun- " dation enough to conclude that men are " free enough to be made anſwerable for " their actions, and to receive according to " what they have done, although how man " is a free agent ſurpaſs my explication and " comprehenſion."

What Mr Locke ſays in a letter to Mr Molineux, Page 23, 24, 8vo. of his familiar letters on the ſubject of *Free-will*, and likewiſe the difference betwixt the chapter on *Power* as it ſtands in the firſt edition of his *Eſſay*, and as it is in the ſubſequent editions, are very well worth obſervation; whatever Mr

* The neceſſity of human actions is juſt as good an argument againſt Revelation, as Revelation is in favour of free agency. The truth is that they are neither of them, until duly proved, any thing more than begging the queſtion; there is however this difference between them, that if Man ſhould upon a due examination be proved to be a neceſſary agent, Revelation muſt be given up; but if Revelation ſhould appear to want a proper degree of proof, the queſtion concerning human liberty would remain juſt as it did; this being a queſtion of another nature, and only diſcuſſible by an analytical inquiry into the faculties and operations of, what we call, our minds.

Mr Locke's opinion might be as a philoſopher, his Chriſtianity obliged him to profeſs at leaſt his believing the fact of man's being an accountable and conſequently a free agent.

I am ſorry to ſay that my Lord Bolingbroke gives his opinion too peremptorily on the ſide of human liberty; among ſeveral paſſages in his *Philoſophical Works* I have particularly remarked the following, Vol. I. Page 40, 102. Vol. IV. Page 97, 382. Vol. V. Page 29, 85, 103, 105, 106, 108, 109, 150, 8vo.

When ſuch a writer as Mr Locke is reduced to call for the aſſiſtance of Revelation in a philoſophical inquiry; when another great author, for ſuch Dr Clarke undoubtedly was, flies to arguments deduced from ſuppoſed conſequences, in order to render his adverſary, or at leaſt his opinion, odious. *Vide* his anſwer to Mr Collins; and when a writer of my Lord Bolingbroke's immenſe parts and learning can put upon paper ſuch paſſages as are above referred to, it is hardly worth while to read any more on the ſubject of Liberty and Neceſſity; whole volumes

volumes wrote in defence of the latter would not have the thouſandth part of the weight with me as ſuch arguments brought in ſupport of the former by Mr LOCKE, Dr CLARKE, and my Lord BOLINGBROKE.

It may not be amiſs to take a tranſient view of the difference between each of theſe three great mens manner of treating the queſtion of human liberty. My Lord BOLINGBROKE very roundly aſſerts that man is a free agent, nay, that his being ſo is a ſelf-evident propoſition, and cannot be denied without lying or renouncing our intuitive knowledge; and yet declines entering into any diſquiſition of this queſtion for fear of going out of his depth in ſounding imaginary fords which are real gulphs, wherein many of the talleſt philoſophers have been drowned, and where even the cautious Mr LOCKE was loſt *.

Mr

* Dr CLARKE in his anſwer to Mr COLLINS, Page 23, takes notice of Mr LOCKE's being much perplexed with regard to man's being able to ſuſpend willing or no. But why was Mr LOCKE thus perplexed? — Becauſe he had raſhly undertaken to ſquare a circle, *i. e.* to make the reſult of a philoſophical inquiry, contrary to the phenomena, coincide with and agree to the ſyſtem of religion eſtabliſhed in his country.

Mr LOCKE, ſurprized to find that the reſult of his philoſophical inquiries led him to concluſions contradictory to certain early received prejudices, or opinions, from which he was determined not to depart, vainly endeavours to diſtinguiſh away thoſe concluſions by fine ſpun metaphyſical refinements, in a manner, ſurely, moſt unworthy of a writer of his great penetration and candour *.

Dr CLARKE, as it appears to me, aims at nothing more than to puzzle and perplex his readers, both by the intricate and confuſed manner of his anſwer to Mr COLLINS, and by the various metaphyſical and dialectical ſubtleties contained therein; and as the victory is uſually adjudged not to thoſe who have truth on their ſide, but to him who has the laſt word in the debate, the Doctor by threatning Mr COLLINS with the interpoſition of the civil † magiſtrate, or at leaſt inſinuating the probability of ſuch interpoſition, not

* *Vide* his chapter on *Power*.

† *Vide* concluſion of Dr CLARKE's anſwer to Mr COLLINS on liberty.

not only prevented that gentleman from unravelling his artful ſophiſms, but likewiſe effectually ſecured the having the laſt word in the diſpute to himſelf; well knowing that by theſe means his anſwer to Mr COLLINS would be looked upon as, and aſſerted to be, a full and compleat one both by the generality of readers, and by the much more numerous tribe of thoſe who judge, condemn, and extol, without reading.



Six OBJECTIONS *againſt the Doctrine of* NECESSITY.

I. IT is contradictory to the univerſal feeling of mankind. *Page* 9.

II. IT is a melancholy and uncomfortable proſpect. *Page* 15.

III. IT maketh God the author of ſin againſt himſelf, and the efficient cauſe of all moral ill. *Page* 17.

IV. Man has within himſelf a power of beginning motion, or a ſelf-moving principle, and therefore muſt be a free agent. *Page* 20. And in Remarks upon Dr CLARKE's anſwer to Mr COLLINS, *paſſim.*

V. IT would if generally believed be productive of very miſchievous conſequences. *Pages* 20, 21.

VI. IT leaveth neither contingency, nor virtue, nor vice, in the world. *Page* 23.

OBJEC-

OBJECTION.

IF the univerſal feeling of mankind does not convince us that we are free agents, it muſt be ſaid that our great Creator has deceived us, *i. e.* has impreſſed upon us a full perſuaſion of what is not; and if in this inſtance, why not in many others? are we then ſure of any thing? are we ſure of the exiſtence of the external world?

This objection ſeems to ſet out with a fallacy; can it be made appear that our great Creator * has impreſſed any perſuaſion whatever on our minds, which are, I conceive, ſo

* 1. Univerſal affirmation is overthrown by one particular negation.

2. The queſtion is not what a man ſays, or thinks, that he feels, but whether ſuch feeling be well or ill grounded, and whether it be real or imaginary.

3. When a man ſays that he feels, I muſt, before ſuch aſſertion has any weight with me, examine whether he does not impoſe upon himſelf, or endeavour to do ſo upon me.

4. Bodily feeling, *i. e.* that feeling which ariſes from the impreſſion of external objects upon our bodies, is very different from that feeling which we call moral, and by which we are ſaid to feel that we are free agents, or have a freedom of will.

ſo formed that our firſt ideas are ſtamped upon them by the impreſſion of outward objects; notions or perſuaſions come afterwards, and it is the taſk of reaſon and reflection to examine whether theſe are formed, and taken up, upon true or falſe principles; to do which, or even to reflect at all upon the operations of, what we call, our intellectual faculties is, I conceive, the lot of very few of the human ſpecies.

It might poſſibly be no improper anſwer to this objection to deny the univerſality of the feeling, which I am ſatisfied might be done with the ſtricteſt regard to truth, but as great ſtreſs is laid upon this ſame feeling, by no leſs an author than Lord BOLINGBROKE, I will venture to throw out a few looſe thoughts on this head, without much regard to order or method.

I muſt in the firſt place obſerve, that the maintainers of neceſſity ſay that man is not endued with free-will * in the manner that he

* If the will of man be not free, or, in other words, if man be not the efficient cauſe of his own volitions, he is not a free agent, as he acts according to the laſt determination

he imagines, or thinks that he feels, himſelf to be, can it therefore be deemed fair to bring this imaginary or pretended feeling as an argument to prove that man is a free agent * ?

There ought ſurely to be a diſtinction made between what is termed phyſical, and, what is called, moral feeling; would it be improper to call the one a natural, and the other an artificial feeling? In many caſes we are ſubject to be deceived by the firſt impreſſions of the former; not however in ſuch a manner as to give us any reaſon to doubt of the exiſtence of the external world, whatever may have been pretended or really imagined by whimſical metaphyſicians.

The

mination of his will, I therefore make uſe of either term, Free-agency or Free-will, as they happen to occur. *Vide* Page —

* But as in diſcuſſing this queſtion it is very uſual to be ſhuffled backwards and forwards by a frivolous jingle upon the terms Free-choice, Free-will, Free-agency, I think it may be proper to obſerve that, upon neceſſitarian principles, motives neceſſitate, that is neceſſarily determine, the choice or will, and choice or will, when thus determined, neceſſarily produces the action, unleſs there be ſome phyſical, *i. e.* natural, impediment which prevents the action from taking place.

The univerſal feeling of our being free agents ſeems to be exactly parallel to another feeling or conſciouſneſs which every man is ſaid to have in his own breaſt with reſpect to the rectitude or pravity, fitneſs or unfitneſs of any action; both theſe feelings proceed, I conceive, from the ſame cauſes. *Vide* Page 35

The ideas we receive from ſenſation reach up to the apparent nature of the ſubſtances which cauſe them; and I am farther convinced of the exiſtence of external objects by their effects, but that which is called moral feeling is equivocal in many inſtances, poſſibly in every one, and as to this particular perſuaſion, or feeling, we are taught to believe the fact of our being free agents from our earlieſt childhood, and it is a queſtion never entered into at all by the bulk of mankind, and the different prejudices of every man are too often an obſtruction to its being candidly examined even by thoſe who are the beſt qualified to examine other queſtions with penetration and candor.

This ſame feeling ſeems to be little more than the lively inward ſentiment of DESCARTES,

TES, and it may not be amiſs to quote a paſſage from M. LEIBNITZ, who is a ſtrong maintainer of human liberty. *C'eſt pourquoy la raiſon que M.* DESCARTES *á alleguée pour prover l'independance de nos actions libres par un pretendu ſentiment vif interne n'a point de force. Nous ne pouvons pas ſentir proprement notre independance, & nous ne nous appercevons pas toujours des cauſes, ſouvent imperceptibles, dont notre reſolution depende.*

Theodicée, Part I. Section 50.

I conceive that all mankind, until convinced of the contrary by inſtruction, or by a long courſe of reflection, are as fully ſatisfied and have as clear, ſenſible, and, as it appears to them, uncontrovertible, feeling of their forming ideas, and of their ſeeing objects, actively, as they are and have of their being endued with free will; does it therefore follow that they are neither ſure of the exiſtence of the external world, nor of their own exiſtence? As to the propoſition itſelf, how few are there who underſtand the meaning of it; be pleaſed to aſk the firſt dozen perſons you meet whether they do not feel themſelves to be free agents, and then proceed

ceed to aſk each of them what they underſtand by the terms of the queſtion.

That every man before he reflects and conſiders upon this ſubject, believes himſelf, and is fully ſatisfied that he feels himſelf to be free is, I preſume, not to be doubted; but this belief or feeling will not, I conceive, ſtand the teſt of an analyſis, I mean an analyſis of, what we call, our intellectual faculties, *viz.* perception, judging, willing.

Il ne faut pas qu'ils me dient, il eſt vray car vous le voyés & ſentés ainſi; il faut qu'il me dient ſi ce que Je penſe ſentir Je le ſens pourtant en effet; & ſi Je le ſens qu'ils me dient après pourquoy Je le ſens, & comment, & quoy.

MONTAIGNE.

Il eſt dont naturel que les hommes ſe perſuadent qu'ils ſe determinent eux meſmes, mais il reſte à examiner s'ils ſe trompent en cela comme en une infinité d'autres choſes qu'ils affirment par une eſpece d'inſtinct, & ſans avoir employé les meditations philoſophiques.

BAYLE reſponſe aux queſtions d'un Provincial.

Quomodo autem opiniones totius ævi quibus infantia protinus imbuitur evinces?

I HAVE

I HAVE read ſomewhere an objection brought againſt the doctrine of neceſſity from the ſuppoſition of its being a melancholy and uncomfortable proſpect *; ſurely the very contrary is true; to contraſt it with the oppoſite ſyſtem believed, or pretended to be believed, by the objector, will require very little trouble; in the one, man is under the direction of an all-wiſe Creator; in the other, he is expoſed to the various temptations ariſing from the world, the fleſh, and the devil; indued it is true with free will, but liable to eternal damnation if he makes a wrong election.

* Dr CLARKE makes this objection in his anſwer to Mr COLLINS on human liberty, and the manner in which he makes it is very remarkable, being, as it appears to me, a plain though tacit acknowledgment of his defeat. The Doctor expatiates upon this head in the latter part of that anſwer; but can any thing be more ridiculous than a pathetic whining expoſtulation in a philoſophical diſpute? Was that learned divine ſincerely of opinion that the reſult of Mr COLLINS's inquiry would render the human ſpecies a jot the more or the leſs free agents, than they would have been if ſuch inquiry had never been entered into? Was he ſincerely of opinion that the manner wherein it ſhould plainly be made appear that GOD had conſtituted the human ſyſtem, ſuppoſing that manner to be what it would, was not abſolutely right and for the beſt?

tion. He is moreover, according to the opinion of many devout Chriſtians, often predeſtinated to damnation from his mother's womb; whether the ſame perſons join the belief of this doctrine with that of free agency, I neither know nor ſhall ever think it worth my while to inquire: But this is not all, if a man happens to die out of the pale of the Chriſtian Church, the whole body of Chriſtians, I conceive, agree that he is infallibly damned *; and each ſect of Chriſtians either without any or with the ſmalleſt exception, concur in damning all men, Chriſtians as well as others, who do not join in communion with that church which each of them pronounces to be the true church of CHRIST, and of which but one can be the true. *Vide* APPENDIX, N° I.

BOTH

* Did not ADAM by one ſingle act of his free will entail the wrath of GOD, death, and damnation, upon his poſterity? — *Et dubitamus adhuc?*

BOTH divines and theiſts, at leaſt ſome of each, join in forming another objection againſt the doctrine of Neceſſity, by aſſerting that this doctrine maketh GOD the author of ſin againſt himſelf, and the efficient cauſe of all moral ill*; now I will fairly own that I can neither conceive the poſſibility of the creature's ſinning againſt its Creator, nor perceive the leaſt difference betwixt

* If man thinks, ſpeaks, and acts neceſſarily, muſt we not ſay that GOD is the author of wicked thoughts, words, and actions? I anſwer, firſt, that the queſtion is whether man does or does not think, ſpeak, and act neceſſarily; a ſincere, humble, neceſſitarian theiſt pretends not to account for every thing relative to GOD and man; and I anſwer, ſecondly, that the nature and formal reaſon of ſin being wholly taken away and annihilated upon the ſuppoſition of man's being duly proved to be a neceſſary agent, all arguments againſt the doctrine of neceſſity brought during the inveſtigation of that queſtion, and founded upon the ſuppoſed abſurdity of its making GOD the author of ſin againſt himſelf, are merely begging the queſtion*, and conſequently do not deſerve to have the leaſt regard paid unto them by any plain man of common underſtanding.

N. B. Sin is only ſpoken of here as an offence againſt GOD, abſtracted from all other conſiderations whatever.

* *i. e.* the exiſtence of ſin, or the poſſibility of the creature's ſinning againſt its Creator.

twixt permitting and cauſing with reſpect to an acknowledged firſt cauſe of infinite power and wiſdom. *Quod eſt cauſa cauſæ eſt cauſa cauſati*, is ſurely a ſelf-evident propoſition in this caſe. But if man can be proved, as I conceive he may, to be a neceſſary agent by arguments founded upon the actual ſtate of things, no ſuppoſed conſequences can invalidate ſuch proof, and thoſe conſequences, being however firſt duly proved, muſt be admitted let them be what they will; I ſuſpect that thoſe conſequences are not ſo much inſiſted upon from a due veneration of the Creator, as from the ſuppoſed importance of the creature. I muſt likewiſe add that anſwers given to objections founded upon conſequences are given merely *ex abundantiâ*, for the truth of a propoſition, and whether certain conſequences neceſſarily flow from it, are two diſtinct queſtions and not to be blended into one, nor is it fair and candid, although it be a very common practice, to ſkip from one to the other.

THE following Letter was wrote ſeveral years ago in conſequence of ſome diſcourſe on this ſubject, and therefore, I hope, may without much impropriety be introduced in this place.

Dear Sir,

" BE pleaſed to take the following hints " into your conſideration when you are a- " gain diſpoſed to amuſe yourſelf with the " queſtion of human liberty.

" That Dr CLARKE and other polemic " divines ſhould, in their writings on this " ſubject, cavil, raiſe much metaphyſical " duſt, call names, and then triumph, is by " no means ſurprizing; but it is matter of " great ſurprize to hear men of a very dif- " ferent turn from them reaſon in juſt the " ſame manner as they do, perſonal abuſe, " and even that not always, excepted.

" There are three arguments brought by " the maintainers of human liberty, every " one of which appears to me to be a mere " fallacy. The firſt fallacy lies, I appre- " hend, in confounding an abſolute power

 " of

" of beginning motion with the bare mo-
" tive faculty, or rather with the being put
" into motion. Man is endued with a mo-
" tive faculty, or power of motion in the
" ſame manner that all other animals are,
" but how motion is communicated to mat-
" ter, or how the animal kind are indued
" with vitality, is what I by no means pre-
" tend to account for.

" The ſecond fallacy conſiſts in the fol-
" lowing method of arguing; The aſſertors
" of neceſſity ſay, that man is not a free a-
" gent in the manner that he imagines him-
" ſelf to be, or thinks that he actually feels
" himſelf to be; but the maintainers of li-
" berty bring this imaginary feeling as a
" ſelf-evident proof of man's being free,
" which is ſurely nothing more than beg-
" ging the queſtion.

" There is a third argument brought by
" the aſſertors of human liberty drawn from
" the miſchievous conſequences which, it is
" ſaid, would follow from the doctrine of
" neceſſity being generally received. This
" argument ſtrictly ſpeaking ought not to
" be introduced while the main queſtion is

" under

" under conſideration, being a manifeſt
" change in the ſtate of the queſtion. I
" conceive however that it is an objection
" of no weight, for the ſituation of human
" creatures in this world is ſuch that it is
" morally impoſſible that this doctrine ſhould
" ever be generally received, probably not
" by one man in a million, nor will the ſpe-
" culative belief of it be attended with any
" bad conſequences with reſpect even to this
" very man's manner of acting; and for the
" proof of this aſſertion I need only deſire
" you to reflect upon the time of life when
" the inveſtigation of ſuch queſtions as this
" of Liberty and Neceſſity is entered into;
" habits of acting are, unchangeably, form-
" ed, and prejudices of every kind have ta-
" ken too deep root to be intirely eradicat-
" ed, long before queſtions of this kind are
" ever thought of.

Adieu.

" *P. S.* I am fully convinced that the ar-
" gument drawn from the univerſal feeling,
" or experience of mankind, is of no weight
" to prove that man is free from neceſſity,
" but at the ſame time I am thoroughly ſa-

 " tisfied

" tisfied that this imaginary feeling, the
" child of education and habit, will now
" and for ever confirm the human ſpecies,
" a particular inſtance here and there ex-
" cepted, in a fixed and unalterable belief,
" or perſuaſion, of their being free agents.
" *Quand à la communication, ou ſi l'on veut à*
" *la contagion, que l'on craint, je ne la crois pas*
" *poſſible. Chaque homme eſt ſi fortement con-*
" *vaincu de la verité des principes dont on a imbu*
" *& comme abreuvé ſon enfance; ſon amour*
" *propre ſe croit ſi intereſſé à les ſoutenir & à*
" *n'en point demordre, que quand j'aurois la*
" *choſe auſſi fortement à cœur qu'elle m'eſt in-*
" *differente, avec toute l'eloquence de* CICERON,
" *je ne pourrois convaincre perſonne d'etre dans*
" *l'erreur.*"

La Mettrie.

OBJEC-

OBJECTION.

THE doctrine of Neceſſity, if admitted, leaveth neither Contingency, nor Virtue, nor Vice in the world.

ANSWER.

IT moſt aſſuredly does not, that is to ſay according to the common and uſual acceptation of the terms Contingency, Virtue, Vice.

I AM frequently aſked the following queſtion, How comes it to paſs that if you are convinced of man's being a neceſſary agent you nevertheleſs talk, project, and feel remorſe, as if you were ſatisfied of your being a free agent*? The anſwer is moſt ready; When did I ever pretend to any exemption from the prejudices of education and habit? When was I ever abſurd enough to ſuppoſe myſelf differently formed from other human creatures, on all of whom, I conceive, our great Creator has impoſed the neceſſity of talking, projecting, and feeling remorſe, as if they were free agents, by the manner in which he has formed them, and by the ſituation wherein he has placed them?

It is not, I am perſuaded, from any ſuperior ſagacity or peneration that here and there an animal of the human ſpecies ſees or thinks that he ſees into the plan of, what we call, moral as well as into that which we call phyſical

* For this plain reaſon, becauſe I am a neceſſary agent, *i. e.* becauſe there is an equal neceſſity for my talking, projecting, and feeling remorſe, as there is for all other events and actions, and as there was for thoſe things happening which occaſioned ſuch talking, &c.

ſical neceſſity, but from a chain of thinking which it is impoſſible for him not to follow.

Hoc quoque fatale eſt ſic ipſum expendere fatum.

It is ſurely ridiculous enough to hear an animal which is begot, born, vegetates, eats, drinks, ſleeps, wakes, p-ſſes, ſh-ts, and dies, in ſpite of its teeth *, to hear ſuch an animal, I ſay, boaſt of its being a free agent, and complain of even the ſuppoſition of the poſſibility of the contrary being true, as of the moſt heinous and offenſive derogation from the importance of its ſpecies. It ſeemeth to me that in ſpite of the pride of the human heart one of the two following propoſitions is true; Every animal from the mite † to the wiſe man of the Stoics is a free agent; or, Every animal from the aforeſaid ſage downwards is a neceſſary agent, or to ſpeak plainly a machine.

No

* May I not ſay likewiſe perceives, thinks, reflects, remembers, forgets, loves, hates, hopes, fears, &c.

† I know very well that learned divines and metaphyſicians have by the plenitude of their power indued man with free will, and left only ſpontaneity, a term of their own invention, to our poor brother animals.

No animal ſeems to be ſtrictly ſpeaking contemptible, unleſs you will ſuppoſe man to be a free agent, who is ſurely upon that ſuppoſition both an odious and contemptible animal; but a difficulty will then ariſe; Why was ſuch an animal created and indued with free will? I only mention this as *ad hominem*; the world and its inhabitants were doubtleſs created for wiſe and good purpoſes totally unknown to, and poſſibly for ever unknowable by, us.

Which method of arguing has the greateſt appearance of candor; That, of men who only maintain and ſupport their opinion, real or pretended, by peremptory aſſertions, equivocal terms, unmeaning diſtinctions, and frivolous quibbles, or by appeals to an imaginary feeling, nay even by appeals to ſacred authority in a philoſophical diſpute; who change the ſtate of the queſtion more ways than one; who endeavour to render their opponents odious by uſing arguments drawn from ſuppoſed conſequences, and who at laſt threaten them, if not plainly at leaſt obliquely, with the hand of power, particular inſtances of all which aſſertions may with the greateſt

greateſt eaſe be produced from the writings of no leſs authors than Mr LOCKE, Doctor CLARKE, and my Lord BOLINGBROKE; or, an humble method of ſearching into the real ſtate of things by an analytical inquiry into the operations and faculties of, what we call, our minds, *viz.* perception, judgment, will, and from their manner of influencing or cauſing human agency, proceeding to conſider whether there be a greater probability of man's being a free agent, or of the contrary?

The maintainers of human liberty ſometimes declare that the inveſtigation of this queſtion is ſurrounded with inextricable labyrinths and unfathomable gulphs; and at other times aſſert, that man's being a free agent is ſo ſelf-evident a truth, and ſo clearly founded on the univerſal feeling of mankind, that it is not to be controverted without a manifeſt lie, and a home-felt contradiction to our cleareſt and beſt determined ideas. I leave to them the taſk of reconciling theſe contradictory aſſertions, for ſuch they ſurely are. I can neither blindly ſubmit to the authority of the greateſt names, nor to the earlieſt received prejudices, but will venture to aſſert that theſe gulphs and labyrinths appear

pear to me to be imaginary, and that they may be paſſed and waded through with the greateſt eaſe and ſafety, if we do not on the one hand enter into them with our eyes hoodwinked and our legs fettered, and on the other hand be contented to ſtop where the GOD of nature has ſet bounds to our knowledge, beyond which bounds the moſt profound divine and ſubtle metaphyſician, notwithſtanding their vain boaſts and abſurd pretenſions, will be unable to advance one ſtep farther than ſo ignorant a perſon as myſelf.

As I have entered into the conſideration of this queſtion purely for my own amuſement or improvement, call it which you will, I am not in the leaſt deſirous of bringing any other perſon into my way of thinking, any more than I ſhould be that the hairs of his head were exactly the ſame as mine; and I hope, and truſt, that I ſhall have reſolution enough to abſtain from entering into the leaſt diſpute on this ſubject with any perſon whatever for the reſt of my life. The doctrine of neceſſity when ſatisfactorily proved, and clearly aſſented to, appears to me to be the ſword which cutteth all knots, the ſolution

tion of all doubts, and the panacea for every uneaſineſs of the human mind; I mean that it is productive of theſe effects in caſe a proper uſe be made of it; whether ſuch uſe ever is or even can be made of it, I preſume not to determine.

It may be objected, that the doctrine of neceſſity cannot be an agreeable and pleaſant ſpeculation, foraſmuch as it ſeems to put a man perſuaded of its truth into the ſituation of a child who having for the firſt time ſeen a puppet ſhow, and being highly delighted with the ſight, would find its pleaſure greatly leſſened on being let into the ſecret that its kings and queens, lords and ladies, *&c.* were only wood and wire; againſt this muſt be laid in the balance that ſatisfaction which ariſes to an inquiſitive mind upon diſcovering or imagining to have diſcovered a very important truth contradicting all our former notions and opinions; and which of theſe will preponderate I neither pretend to determine, nor am at all deſirous to know.

Upon the whole, it appears to me that the doctrine of neceſſity, when thus proved and aſſented to, is the ſummit of all ſpeculative philoſophy.

Diſpicere

Diſpicere unde queas alios, paſſimque videre
Errare, atque viam palantes quærere vitæ.

I will not preſume to ſay that my little reading or reflections have procured me any real knowledge, excepting that of the exiſtence of a firſt intelligent Cauſe of infinite power and wiſdom, of whoſe exiſtence I am moſt firmly and unalterably perſuaded, but the reſult of this reading and theſe reflections has been, and is, moſt ſatisfactory to my own mind; as to any future change of ſentiments, I am fully ſatisfied that I muſt neceſſarily ſee every propoſition in that point of light wherein it appears to me at the time of my examining it, and as to one particular change which often happens to the ſons of ADAM, or at leaſt is often reported to have happened to them, when they are dead and cannot contradict the truth of ſuch report, and on which change or ſuppoſed change great ſtreſs is uſually laid, Mr CHUBB in his ſecond volume of *Poſthumous Works*, Page 361, 362, has, according to my poor judgment, given a very clear and rational account of the motives which generally if not always produce it, and of the proper degree of weight it ought to have with reſpect to the concluſions we ſhould draw from it.

ORIGIN

ORIGIN of ILL.

I AM moſt firmly, and I truſt unalterably perſuaded of the exiſtence of a firſt intelligent Cauſe, of infinite power and wiſdom, which perſuaſion is founded upon the order and deſign which appear throughout all that we know of the univerſe; and with this perſuaſion ſo grounded I am fully content and ſatisfied, and preſume not to aim at any farther demonſtration of the exiſtence of that Being whoſe manner of exiſting is alike incomprehenſible to me with his manner of knowing and cauſing; and I am therefore fully convinced that every thing in our little world, as well as in every other part of the univerſe, muſt neceſſarily be right and for the beſt, although I may not be able, as moſt aſſuredly I am not, to account for many things both in the phyſical and in, what we call, the moral ſyſtem of our planet. When I hear the goodneſs of GOD called in queſtion by one

one ſet of reaſoners, and their opponents replying that GOD's good and gracious purpoſes have been thwarted by man, with reſpect to the origin and introduction of ill into the world, but that every thing relating to its origin and introduction, and to the unequal diſtribution of it in this world, will be ſet right in a future ſtate; and when I hear another ſet of reaſoners aſſert that man's being a free agent is little if any thing leſs than a ſelf-evident propoſition, and conſequently that man bringeth all moral ill upon himſelf, *Vide* Lord BOLINGBROKE, Vol. IV. Page 337, 8vo. and yet not even endeavouring to ſupport ſuch peremptory aſſertions with the leaſt ſhadow of proof, I am diſpoſed to be peeviſh or to laugh according to the mood I happen to be in. For my own part I cannot help thinking that all inquiries into the origin of, what is called, ill, and all the various manners of accounting for it, and of doing what Mr POPE calls, "juſtifying ing the ways of GOD to man," and my Lord BOLINGBROKE "pleading the cauſe of GOD himſelf," are unneceſſary and even abſurd upon theiſtical principles. The moſt reſpectable theiſts, Lord BOLINGBROKE for inſtance,

inſtance, are apt to fall into the ſame error for which they very juſtly cenſure the divines of our church, for, if I miſtake not, Roman Catholic divines do not ſo generally fall into this error, I mean the error of quitting intrenchments wherein they, *i.e.* theiſts, cannot be forced, and raſhly undertaking to contend with divines and atheiſts in a field, as well as with arms, of their enemies own chooſing; a very particular ſpecimen of which may be obſerved in Lord BOLINGBROKE's *Philoſophical Works*, Vol. V. Page 1, 8vo.

If the exiſtence of a firſt intelligent cauſe of infinite power and wiſdom be demonſtrated or allowed, all farther inquiries into the reaſons why GOD has conſtituted the ſyſtem, phyſical and moral, of our planet in the manner that he has been pleaſed to conſtitute it, and all endeavours to reconcile thoſe ſuppoſed reaſons to our weak and limited underſtandings, are ſurely both abſurd and unneceſſary; if the atheiſt will not agree to the demonſtration of the exiſtence of a firſt intelligent Cauſe, as brought by the theiſt, all diſputes between them ſhould be put an end to at once; and with reſpect to the di-

vine, the theiſt will free himſelf from a taſk too hard, I preſume, for the ſtrength of man to go through with, and will reſerve to himſelf the eaſy one of refuting whatever arguments can be brought againſt him by that antagoniſt; I call this an eaſy taſk, becauſe it really appears to me that a divine can never have the leaſt advantage in point of argument over a theiſt, unleſs the latter inadvertently ſuffers ſome falſe principle to be palmed upon him, or weakly grants one.

LAW of NATURE.

IT is aſſerted that there is a moral law of nature, and for the truth of this aſſertion the univerſal feeling of mankind is appealed unto, as it was before with regard to free will. I anſwer, that the queſtion is not fairly ſtated; man is ſuppoſed to be in what is termed a natural ſtate, whereas every man is neceſſarily in what may ſurely be called an artificial ſtate, with reſpect to religious, national, local, educational, habitual, prejudices. I have a father and mother, old, poor, and bed-rid, whom I chearfully maintain by the ſweat of my brows, and feel a great ſelf-complacency from the reflection of having done my duty, and ſhould ſhudder at the thoughts of acting in a contrary manner; but an honeſt Hottentot, who has perhaps been all his life a more dutiful child than I have been, leaves his father and mother to die in their hut of hunger, or to be devoured by

wild beaſts, the moment they become bedrid, without feeling the leaſt compunction or remorſe for ſo doing. If this conſcious feeling of what is fit or unfit were admitted to be impreſſed upon our minds, would it not imply a certain degree of conſtraint upon the ſuppoſed freedom of our wills? But the truth is, or at leaſt it appears ſo to me, that this conſcious feeling is exactly parallel to the ſuppoſed univerſal feeling of our being free agents, and is an effect produced by the very ſame cauſes as that ſuppoſed feeling is.

Upon the whole, it would be very abſurd for a ſincere neceſſitarian theiſt to perplex himſelf with the various and contradictory treatiſes and opinions wrote and eſpouſed by ſo many learned authors concerning the Law of nature; his law of nature and theirs are very different; according to him, the law of nature is the law eſtabliſhed by the GOD of nature, which law is of courſe inviolable, and not poſſible to be thwarted or diſobeyed by any created being; which law he conceives to be this, that as every effect both in the phyſical and in, what we call, the moral world

world is neceſſarily produced by ſome cauſe *, ſo every effect muſt in its turn become a cauſe with regard to that one particular effect which is and muſt be produced by it, and which very identical effect, and no other, muſt have been ſo produced by it; and this chain of cauſes and effects ‡ he is fully perſuaded began when it pleaſed GOD to call this world and its inhabitants into exiſtence, and will laſt

* When I ſay that every effect is produced by ſome cauſe, I do not mean that there is neceſſarily one ſingle particular cauſe of every effect, for I conceive that there is always a concourſe of many cauſes which jointly form, or become, the cauſe which produces the effect, and likewiſe that every one of theſe concurrent cauſes was produced by a like concurrence of former cauſes, and ſo upwards and downwards from the beginning to the conſummation of all things.

‡ Mr HOBBES, in his *Tripos*, Page 281, ſtileth GOD the firſt link in this chain of cauſes and effects; now I can by no means approve of this expreſſion, which ſeems to be very inconſiſtent with the principles of an humble theiſt, according to which the chain of ſecond cauſes is totally diſtinct from the great firſt Cauſe, by whoſe energy all ſecond cauſes ſolely exiſt, and betwixt whom and the firſt link of the chain of ſecond cauſes the diſtance is ſurely infinite. Such theiſt pretends not to account for the reaſons why all ſecond cauſes were called into exiſtence, and are what they are.

laſt ſo long as it ſhall pleaſe their great Creator to continue them in exiſtence.

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" It ſeemeth to me that I have found the
" direct path which leadeth to truth, and
" have ſettled my mind with ſatisfaction even
" in thoſe matters which ſeem the moſt dark
" and doubtful to others; and although this
" be at the end of my day, when my ſun is
" ſetting, yet I would not for any thing
" be without the proſpect it has given me,
" there being ſo much irreſiſtible truth,
" beauty, and conſiſtency in it."

LOCKE.

SCRAPS.

SCRAPS.

I Never pretend in ſpeculative points, and rarely in matters of fact, to aſſert that this or that propoſition is true or falſe; but I only ſay, or at leaſt my meaning only is, that thus ſuch a matter appears to me at preſent: Would it not therefore be highly abſurd in me to enter into any diſpute about, or into any defence of, my own opinions? could the upſhot of ſuch diſpute be any more than this, I do ſee objects as I do ſee them, I do think as I do think?

In matters of diſputation it is too often exactly the ſame whether you diſpute with an ignorant perſon, or with one of real knowledge in the matters diſputed of; the firſt bringeth a ſtring of arguments which in the ſincerity of his heart he firmly believes to be true, the other oppoſes you with juſt the

ſame ſort of arguments, of the futility of which he is as fully convinced as you can be.

When I hear ſo many ingenious perſons puzzling themſelves with, or read their learned diſcourſes upon, the ſubjects of Liberty and Neceſſity, Origin of Ill, *&c.* it puts me in mind of thoſe lines of MILTON wherein he deſcribes the employment, or converſations, of ſome of the fallen ſpirits in Hell.

> Others apart ſat on a hill retir'd
> In thoughts more elevate, and reaſon'd high
> Of providence, fore-knowledge, will, and fate,
> Fix'd fate, free-will, fore-knowledge abſolute;
> Of good and evil much they argued then,
> Of final happineſs or miſery;
> And found no end, in wandring mazes loſt
> Of wiſdom vain and falſe philoſophy.

This ſeems a very proper employment for reſtleſs, damned ſpirits; as in another ſyſtem the daughters of DANAUS were condemned to fill a ſieve with water, and SISYPHUS to roll a great ſtone, which was fated to recoil perpetually, up-hill: But ſhall the man who has found a clue to guide himſelf through what appears an inextricable labyrinth to others;

others; who has found a firm path over which to paſs ſafely amidſt thoſe gulphs and quickſands where the moſt cautious are ſaid to have been loſt; ſhall he, I ſay, ſuffer his precious ſkain of thread to be broke or ſtolen from him? ſhall he ſuffer himſelf to be decoyed, forced he cannot be, from his firm ground into thoſe dangers from whence he has ſo fortunately eſcaped?

NOTWITHSTANDING Mr LOCKE's aſſertion, in his chapter of our complex ideas of ſubſtances, that we have as clear ideas of the ſubſtance of ſpirit as we have of that of body; I am fully ſatisfied, with reſpect to myſelf, that I have no ideas of the former, but that I have ſeveral very clear ideas of the latter, both as to actuality of exiſtence, and as to ſeveral properties inhering continually in it. I am not greatly ſurprized at this aſſertion's coming from Mr LOCKE, but am thoroughly perſuaded that it is founded upon the abuſe of the word * ſpirit, and likewiſe that

* Mr LOCKE in his chapter upon the abuſe of words, amongſt other abuſes ſpecifies the two following ones; firſt by uſing them without clear and diſtinct ideas, and ſecondly by taking them for things. How is it poſſible to have clear and diſtinct ideas of the ſubſtance of a finite ſpirit whoſe very exiſtence is not knowable? *Vide* Mr LOCKE, Book IV. Chap. . Sect. 12. Is it not a mere abuſe of a word to reaſon upon it as if it ſtood for ſomething real, when we are not ſure that the idea of which it is intended to be a ſign has any real, exiſting, archetype?

As to the impropriety and unfairneſs of Mr LOCKE's compariſon, I muſt refer myſelf to what my Lord BOLINGBROKE has ſaid on that head, Vol. I. Page 210, &c. 8vo. who has ſet this matter in a much better light than I can pretend to do.

that the compariſon brought by him to illuſtrate it is improper, inadequate, and unfair. It may indeed ſeem odd in one point of light that this aſſertion ſhould come from Mr LOCKE; that is to ſay, when we conſider how much he leaned or ſeemed to lean to the opinion of the ſoul's materiality. I have read the following remark ſomewhere but cannot recollect where — "Men of the greateſt ge-
"nius, when they relinquiſh by principle the
"uſe of their reaſon, are only enabled by
"the vigour of their mind to work them-
"ſelves the deeper into error and abſur-
"dity."

Dr CLARKE in his Introduction to the evidences of natural and revealed religion, divides the Deiſts into four ſorts, or claſſes, and declares that the principles of all of them muſt lead unavoidably to abſolute Atheiſm. The Doctor in this diviſion, or enumeration, expreſſly calls the fourth the laſt ſort; by which, I conceive, he muſt be ſuppoſed to imply that there are no other ſorts of Deiſts but thoſe four by him ſo ſpecified. In this diviſion the Doctor has, for reaſons beſt known to himſelf, omitted the neceſſitarian deiſt, the ſceptical deiſt, by which term I mean the deiſt who is a ſceptic excluſive of his belief of a firſt intelligent Cauſe, and poſſibly many other kinds of deiſts. I muſt likewiſe obſerve, that no man can with any degree of candour be charged with atheiſm who profeſſes to believe the exiſtence of a firſt intelligent Cauſe, although he will not preſume to account for the whole ſtate of things relative to GOD and man. It is indeed probable that the Doctor might not find a ſingle deiſt who would allow that his principles were preciſely the ſame with any one of the Doctor's four ſorts; however I do not pretend

pretend to aſſert this poſitively, nor concern myſelf with the fairneſs or unfairneſs of the Doctor's definitions, which do not in the leaſt affect a neceſſitarian deiſt. The Doctor afterwards aſſerts that there is NOW no ſuch thing as a conſiſtent ſyſtem of Deiſm. I am not ſure what the Doctor means by the term CONSISTENT; if he means a ſyſtem conſiſtent with ſound and unprejudiced reaſon, the objection may be retorted againſt Chriſtianity itſelf, nor has this learned divine been able to eſtabliſh ſuch a conſiſtency, *Vide Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion*, Prop. 13. — But if by the term CONSISTENT the Doctor means to reproach the Deiſts with not being united in one regular, uniform, ſyſtem of faith; I anſwer, firſt, That there is no ſuch ſyſtem of Chriſtianity, which is divided into almoſt innumerable ſects differing from each other in the moſt important points, and ſcarcely agreeing in any one point more clearly and explicitly than in that of each ſect condemning all who differ from themſelves to eternal damnation*; and I anſwer, ſecondly, That unity of faith, although it be an eſſential of Chriſtianity, is by no means an article

* *Vide* APPENDIX, N° I.

article of the Deiſt's creed, except in the one point of the exiſtence, unity, and omnipotence of the firſt intelligent Cauſe. Indeed if by the term CONSISTENT the Doctor ſhould be ſuppoſed to mean a compleat ſyſtem which accounts for every thing relative to GOD and man, I moſt readily acknowledge that no deiſt, in his ſenſes, will ever ſay that deiſm is ſuch a ſyſtem.

Neceſſitarian Deiſm appears to me to be a moſt conciſe, uniform, and probable ſyſtem; and ſeems to be the moſt conformable of all ſyſtems to the belief of an omnipotent firſt Cauſe, and to give the moſt conſiſtent account of the whole actual ſtate, as diſtinguiſhed by the terms *phyſical* and *moral*, of our planet. The neceſſitarian Deiſt will not take upon him to give any account why things are as they are; much leſs will he preſume to aſſert and preſcribe what is right and fitting for GOD to do; and leaſt of all will he dare to reſt the proof of GOD's exiſtence upon peremptory aſſertions of eternal differences of ſuppoſed fitneſſes and unfitneſſes, and upon the will of GOD being neceſſarily determined to act according to ſuch ſuppoſed fitneſſes

fitneſſes or unfitneſſes, nay, even as they appear to our weak and limited underſtandings; as I conceive many divines have, and as I know Dr Cl. .oſt particular manner has, done *.

A

* "The will of God is neceſſarily determined." — I find this expreſſion quoted by Mr Collins in his anſwer to Mr Clarke's third defence of his letter to Mr Dodwell; but in the eighth edition of Dr Clarke on the attributes it ſtands thus — "The will of God "does neceſſarily determine itſelf." — I cannot perceive any eſſential difference betwixt theſe two manners of expreſſion, but I would willingly avoid all ſuſpicion of quoting unfairly. But after all it ſeems to me that talking of God's will is as improper as talking of his wrath, repentance, or hinder parts, &c. We are ſurely guilty of great preſumption when we transfer thoſe terms by which we denote the faculties of our own minds, *viz.* perception, judgment, will, to the incomprehenſible eſſence of our great Creator.

A ſincere theiſt is not in the leaſt embaraſſed by the long agitated queſtion, whether matter be created or eternal; he ſuppoſes it created by the . . firſt intelligent Cauſe, and acknowledges his utter inability to comprehend the manner of ſuch ſuppoſed creation, nor preſumeth to account for the reaſons of its being created. He perceiveth order and deſign throughout all that we know of the univerſe, and he is ſenſible that nothing is produced in our little world without a Cauſe, and theſe are ſufficient proofs to him of the exiſtence, unity, and omnipotence of the firſt intelligent Cauſe; and he will not ſuffer this demonſtration, for ſuch it manifeſtly appears to him, to be unravelled or ſhook by any cavil or objection whatever.

Neither pure theiſm nor ſpeculative atheiſm will ever, I preſume, be the religion of the many, neither of them it is probable will ever be without followers among the few.

B. Ochinus *de libero arbitrio.*

THIS work conſiſts of eight difficulties, which the author calls Labyrinths, and eight ſolutions of theſe difficulties.

The four firſt Labyrinths are oppoſed to the maintainers of Liberty, and the firſt of them ſeems founded upon true principles and cogent; the ſecond and third are very frivolous, the fourth is cogent *ad hominem.*

The four Labyrinths oppoſed to the maintainers of Neceſſity are all moſt frivolous.

The eight ſolutions of theſe Labyrinths are all moſt frivolous: however I only mean that thus this matter appears to me.

METHODISM.

IT ſeemeth to me that * * * * * was founded upon enthuſiaſtical principles, and that its firſt propagators were enthuſiaſts; and this enthuſiaſm extended both to ſpeculation and practice; but when it became the eſtabliſhed religion and endowed with temporal honours and emoluments, the ſpeculative enthuſiaſm was a little ſoftned, and the practical enthuſiaſm in a great meaſure laid aſide; and ever ſince, at leaſt in the church of *England*, for the Romiſh church has uſually found means of guiding her enthuſiaſts ſo as to make them of uſe to her general ſyſtem of politics, whenever any good Chriſtians, as I doubt not ſeveral methodiſt teachers are, and particularly Mr J. WESLEY, endeavour to bring Chriſtianity back to its firſt principles, the Sanhedrim are up in arms, and if the cry be not in plain terms *Tolle, tolle, crucifige*; becauſe in this country the civil power does not entirely ſubmit the ſword of juſtice to their guidance and direction, yet the moſt oppro-

opprobrious epithets * are very liberally beſtowed upon theſe good Chriſtians, whether diſtinguiſhed by the title of Methodiſts, or by any other denomination, and no calumnies are ſpared to render both paſtors and flocks odious and contemptible in the eyes of their brother Chriſtians.

Mr J. Wesley ſeems to have ſet out with the ſincerity of a good Chriſtian, and moſt rationally and conſiſtently on the principles of ſuch a one; but he became at laſt bewildered in the labyrinths of a ſyſtem whoſe *credenda* are unintelligible, and whoſe *agenda* are impracticable †; but notwithſtanding his credulity and enthuſiaſm, I can ſee no reaſon, either from his Journals or his account of

* I have heard the poor Methohiſts accuſed of being madmen, by ſome perſons who were too candid to condemn them in the lump as hypocrites and impoſtors; but the very ſame reproach has been caſt upon their betters, *Vide* Mark iii. 21. Acts xxvi. 24.

† *Credenda.*] Trinity in Unity, Hypoſtatical Union, &c.

Agenda.] *Vide* Sermon upon the Mount, the ſum of which, as comprehended in one precept, ſtandeth thus; *Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect*, Matt. v. 48.

of the Methodiſts, to ſuſpect him of hypocriſy. As to the diſſenſions betwixt Mr WHITEFIELD and him, they ſeem to be no more than what happened in the infant church of CHRIST betwixt perſons all and each of whom were ſuppoſed to be under the immediate, actual, inſpiration of the Holy Ghoſt. I pretend not to judge of the ſubject matter of theſe diſputes; Mr WHITEFIELD's opinions muſt, I preſume, be deemed the moſt orthodox, being ſurely the doctrine of St PAUL and of the church of *England*, ſo far as the writings of the firſt and the articles of the latter are intelligible to me: Mr WESLEY's opinion is by much the more amiable of the two, that is to ſay if I rightly comprehend it; but in truth I am very indifferent whether I do or no.

A Treatiſe was publiſhed ſome years ago, intitled, *The Enthuſiaſm of Papiſts and Methodiſts compared*, which was then aſcribed to Dr LAVINGTON, Biſhop of *Exeter*, but I think his friends have ſince denied its having been wrote by him; this treatiſe appears to me to be a very injudicious performance: How exact a parallel might a Methodiſt defenſively, and a Deiſt offenſively, draw betwixt the firſt Chriſtians

Chriſtians and the Methodiſts? Can any thing be more abſurd and ridiculous than to hear the profeſſors of a religion founded upon enthuſiaſtical principles, object enthuſiaſm to thoſe who endeavour to bring it back to the principles of its primitive inſtitution? If it ſhould be objected to the modern Methodiſts that the firſt propagators of Chriſtianity worked miracles; the ſame objection will lie againſt thoſe proteſtant divines, if any ſuch there are, who go forth and preach the glad tidings of the goſpel to Pagans and Mahometans; the Roman Catholics indeed will have a better right to make this objection, as miracles are not only aſſerted to have been, but are ſtill ſaid to be daily wrought by the ſaints of their church.

The previous queſtion.

Before I will enter into the diſquiſition of theſe matters I muſt inſiſt upon your proving to my ſatisfaction, both by external and internal evidence, the authenticity of thoſe books which you call the Scriptures, and that every thing contained therein, whether hiſtorical, prophetical, or doctrinal, can with propriety be deemed to be the word of GOD.

CURSORY
REMARKS
UPON
Dr CLARKE's Anſwer to Mr COLLINS's Inquiry concerning *Human Liberty.*

Dr CLARKE publiſhed an Anſwer to this Inquiry, to which Anſwer Mr COLLINS did not make any Reply, for although he did not think the Doctor had any advantage over him in the argument, yet as he had repreſented Mr COLLINS's opinion as dangerous in its conſequences, and very improper to be inſiſted on, the latter, after ſuch an inſinuation, found that he could not proceed in the diſpute upon equal terms.

BAYLE's *Dictionary in* Engliſh, *Article* COLLINS.

REMARKS

UPON

Dr *CLARKE*'s Anſwer to Mr *COLLINS*.

I Muſt in the firſt place obſerve that the Doctor's aſſertion of man's having a power of beginning motion, is plainly begging the queſtion. A clock is a machine put together by a man, but man, ſay the aſſertors of Neceſſity, is a very different machine, though really one, being endued by his Creator with ſenſation and reflection, and impelled to action by phyſical and by, what we call, moral cauſes. As to beginning motion, man is ſo far from having ſuch a power, that he is under a neceſſity of continuing motion from the time of his being begot unto the hour of his death.

Page 5. " For the pulſation of the heart, " *&c.*"

Dr

Dr CLARKE having mentioned this matter, it may not be amiſs to ſay a few words upon it, eſpecially as the maintainers of human liberty frequently call upon their opponents, with an air of inſult and triumph, to reflect upon the diſtinction and difference betwixt the two kinds of motion appertaining to the human body; one, the circulation of the blood, *&c.* which they allow to be involuntary or neceſſary; the other, conſiſting of all the various modes of action, which they term voluntary, and ſay, that it is man's being able to perform theſe in whatever manner he chooſes or pleaſes, abſtracted from natural impediments, which conſtitutes him a free agent. To all this I anſwer, That this laſt kind of motion intirely depends upon, and reſults from his being put into the firſt kind of motion by his Creator, and that it ceaſes when his vital principal ceaſes; and I ſay farther, That as theſe actions or motions are neceſſarily produced by the laſt determination of his will, of whoſe volitions he is not the efficient cauſe, he is, in deſpite of any frivolous quibble upon the term, a neceſſary agent. Man is as much neceſſitated to wipe his backſide, when he does wipe it,

as

as he was to perform the act of exoneration, which joined with certain motives of cleanliness and conveniency, formed or became the cause which necessarily produced a volition or will to wipe; and this volition or will when so determined as necessarily produced the act of wiping; in like manner at another time, laziness, haste, or other motives, may necessitate this Lord of the creation to omit an act of such importance *.

Page 6. "To be an agent signifies to have a power of beginning motion, and motion cannot begin necessarily."

I an-

* In like manner at another time, laziness, haste, or other motives shall necessitate this Lord of the creation, this transcendent animal, who is little lower than the angels, who is crowned with glory and honour, who by virtue of his immortal, immaterial part, has a cognation with the divine essence, between whom and GOD the Father have passed many personal conferences and covenants, for whose sake GOD the Son became incarnate, and suffered death upon the cross, and whose body is the living temple of the Holy Ghost, shall necessitate him, I say, to omit an act of such importance.

I anſwer, That man is put into motion by GOD, and conſequently motion in man begins neceſſarily.

Page 6. " Man has received the power of " beginning motion from the will of a ſu- " perior free agent *."

I anſwer, That the receiving the power of beginning motion, in the manner that man has received it, is nothing more in plain *Engliſh* than being put into motion; the Doctor quibbles upon the term power of beginning motion, concerning which *Vide* Page [illegible], &c.

The Doctor, Page 7, puts this queſtion to Mr COLLINS; " Why did he write before " he was willing to expreſs to others what he " meant?" I anſwer, That he was not unwilling

* GOD and man it ſeems are equally free agents; however the Doctor allows that GOD is the ſuperior; many inſtances may be brought both in this and in other of the Doctor's writings, of his endeavouring to eſtabliſh an equality betwixt GOD and man, with reſpect to their faculties or perfections; thoſe faculties or perfections are, according to this learned divine, the ſame in kind, and differ only in degree. *Vide* Page [illegible]

willing to expreſs to others what he meant, but he was obliged to do this with ſome reſerve and caution, and not to deliver the whole of his meaning in plain terms, for reaſons ſo very apparent that it would be ſuperfluous to mention them; on this head *Vide* Lord BOLINGBROKE, Vol. II. Page 129. Vol. IV. Page 351. Vol. V. Page 334, 335. 8vo. Indeed what the Doctor ſays himſelf in the concluſion of his anſwer, when he very judiciouſly flies to conſequences, and gives broad hints of the interpoſition of the civil magiſtrate, ſhews plainly the neceſſity Mr COLLINS was under of concealing his meaning, at leaſt in ſome degree. *Vide* Page 79

Mr COLLINS, in Page 11 of his *Inquiry*, ſtates and explains the nature of the queſtion; what Dr CLARKE ſays by way of anſwer is chiefly, if not entirely, contained in Page 4, 5, 6, 10, 19. of his *Remarks:* I appeal to thoſe pages for the validity of the Doctor's anſwer; in truth, after the peruſal of that page in Mr COLLINS's *Inquiry*, and after obſerving what the Doctor ſays in anſwer thereto, and his manner of ſhuffling it over, it is hardly worth any reaſonable man's while to concern himſelf any farther with the Doctor's

tor's *Remarks*. Dr CLARKE artfully, but moſt unfairly, ſlides from the real ſtate of the queſtion to Mr COLLINS's manner of expreſſing himſelf, and without taking notice of Mr COLLINS's ſtate of the queſtion, or of his explanation thereof, changes the queſtion into a quibbling diſpute upon the term neceſſary agent; all this the Doctor well knew would paſs with the bulk of readers for a full and compleat anſwer; but when ſuch a writer as Dr CLARKE proceeds in this manner, can any plain man of common underſtanding have the leaſt remaining doubt? *Vide Biblioth. Critique du* P. SIMON, Vol. II. Page 27.

Mr COLLINS, in Page 31 of his *Inquiry*, reduces the actions of men, where liberty may be ſuppoſed to be concerned, to four; Perception of Ideas, Judging, Willing, Doing as we will; now I will allow, to avoid any diſpute on ſo trifling a buſineſs, that the term ACTION may poſſibly be improper in this place, although I am by no means ſure that it really is ſo, but Mr COLLINS's meaning is nevertheleſs very clear; on this ſlip, ſuppoſing it to be one, the Doctor lays great ſtreſs, and expatiates largely, as if it was a matter

matter of the utmoſt importance towards ſettling the point of man's being a free or a neceſſary agent.

The Doctor is very apt, an inſtance of which may be met with in Page 37, 38, of this anſwer, to analyſe, preſcribe, and define the attributes of GOD in the moſt familiar and dogmatical manner; but I ſhould be glad to know from whence this knowledge of the Doctor's ariſes; the great firſt Cauſe is, beyond all poſſibility of doubt, alike incomprehenſible to him, and to the moſt ignorant of the ſons of men; I will not ſtop even here, but will aſſert, as on a point wherein dogmaticalneſs is laudable, that our great Creator, as to his manner of exiſting, knowing, and cauſing, is alike incomprehenſible to the moſt profound divine and ſubtle metaphyſician, and to the loweſt animal of the brute creation. From whence does the authority of Dr CLARKE ariſe, that his *ipſe dixit* ſhall be ſufficient to diſtinguiſh away the omniſcience of GOD, *Vide* Page 37, 38, 39, of his anſwer, might he not with equal right diſtinguiſh away GOD's omnipreſence or omnipotence? I am not acquainted with the Doctor's writings upon the Trinity, was his autho-

authority in that point eſteemed valid by the Doctors of our church?

The Doctor, in his anſwer to Mr COLLINS's ſecond argument, in which anſwer he is ſo perplexed and puzzling that it is difficult to follow him, aſſerts that Mr COLLINS has an atheiſtical meaning in the argument contained in Page 57, and in the concluſion thereof in Page 59, of his *Inquiry*, and that Mr COLLINS means to inſinuate that there is no ſuch thing as a ſelf-moving principle in the univerſe, and conſequently no GOD. Now the queſtion ſolely was, whether man be a free or a neceſſary agent, and therefore it cannot ſurely be ſuppoſed, with any degree of candor, that Mr COLLINS meant to deny the exiſtence of a firſt Cauſe, ſelf-exiſtent, the firſt Mover and Creator of all things; and I farther appeal to Page 57, 58, 59, of Mr COLLINS's *Inquiry*, in which pages the Doctor pretends that this inſinuation is contained, for the fairneſs or unfairneſs of this accuſation; but I muſt likewiſe declare, that if Mr COLLINS ſhould be thought to have a latent atheiſtical meaning, I look upon ſuch meaning to affect himſelf only, and apprehend that the queſtion of human liberty

liberty is no ways connected with his manner of diſcuſſing it, and that a Theiſt may ſupport the doctrine of neceſſity upon theiſtical principles; and in like manner it muſt be acknowledged that Dr CLARKE's manner of anſwering Mr COLLINS is by no means concluſive as to the main queſtion, which remains juſt as it would have been if neither Mr COLLINS nor Dr CLARKE had ever exiſted; although weak arguments, evaſions, *&c.* from ſuch a man as Dr CLARKE, are ſhrewd preſumptions that he had no better to bring.

The Doctor's accuſation of Mr COLLINS is founded upon this poſition, that both his argument and his concluſion are univerſal; now I find the Doctor quoted by the author of a book called *Eſſays on the Principles of Morality*, Page 220, as making uſe of the following argument, *viz.* " Every thing muſt " have a cauſe, for if any thing wanted a " cauſe it would produce itſelf, that is, exiſt " before it exiſted, which is impoſſible;" this argument is ſurely as much an univerſal one as that of Mr COLLINS, and yet it would be very unfair and trifling to inſinuate from

thence that the Doctor intended to deny the being of a GOD.

The Doctor aſſerts, Page 42, that Mr COLLINS's opinion abſolutely takes away the foundation of all religion; this is changing the ſtate of the queſtion, by flying to arguments drawn from ſuppoſed conſequences, and tends to make Mr COLLINS obnoxious to the civil magiſtrate, and his opinion odious in the eyes of the world, and is therefore very unfair in a philoſophical diſpute.

Dr CLARKE ſays, in his *Demonſtration of the Being and Attributes of God*, Page 565, or thereabouts, folio, as follows, " It is only a " moral neceſſity which is produced by mo- " tives, and a moral neceſſity is no neceſſity " at all *." Motives are here allowed to be produc-

* After all, do not metaphyſicians perplex us by the terms PHYSICAL and MORAL? is it not ſufficient to ſay that motives produce a natural neceſſity, *i. e.* they naturally and neceſſarily determine the man to act? it is the nature of man, as GOD has been pleaſed to appoint, to be thus determined and neceſſitated to action by motives; and this is done in a manner alike incomprehenſible to the moſt ſubtle metaphyſician, and to the horſe which carries him. Is not the diſtinction betwixt moral and phyſical neceſſity, a diſtinction without a difference? I preſume not to aſſert this, it is only propoſed as a doubt. *Vide* APPENDIX N° II.

productive of moral neceſſity, but the Doctor in his anſwer to Mr COLLINS endeavours, with great candor and perſpicuity, to ſhow that a moral neceſſity is no neceſſity at all, and that motives or reaſons do not determine a man to act, but that it is the man who determines himſelf. To this I can only ſay, that ſuch diſtinctions are too refined for my comprehenſion, which is ſo dull that I cannot perceive any difference betwixt motives determining a man to act, and their determining, occaſioning, or inducing, a man to determine himſelf.

The Doctor repeatedly uſes the term ſelf-moving principle, well knowing that the bulk of his readers would confound this term with the faculty or power which man is endued with of moving his body, or any part thereof, and which power he has in common with all other animals. The Doctor particularly mentions this Page 42, 43, which argument, if I miſtake not, is no more than this; " I Dr CLARKE aſſert, that man is " compoſed of two ſubſtances, one of which " I call ſpirit, without which I ſay that man " could neither move nor think, and by " which I aſſert that man has a power of

" beginning motion: if you COLLINS deny " this, I call upon you to give me a clear " account how matter is put into motion, " and is made capable of thinking, and how " particular modes of motion follow, or are " occaſioned by, the impulſe of thought or " will." The neceſſitarian theiſt will very readily anſwer this queſtion by ſaying, that what we call intellectual faculties, or ſpirit, and mobility or vitality, have been added to matter by our great Creator in a manner totally unknown to him, and that he neither comprehends how matter is put into motion, nor how what we call intellect acteth upon matter, nor how it is acted upon by it, and pretends not in the leaſt to account for it; and he may in his turn call upon the Doctor, or any other learned divine, for a clear and diſtinct account how his ſuppoſed immaterial ſubſtance is annexed to, and contained in a material ſubſtance, and how they reciprocally act upon each other.

In truth, when I reflect upon the general tenor of the Doctor's anſwer, with reſpect to the perplexed and puzzling manner thereof, as well as upon each particular fallacy, evaſion, omiſſion, and equivocal expreſſion contained

tained therein; and when I find, to compleat all, Mr COLLINS threatned by this very orthodox divine with the interpoſition of the civil magiſtrate, I cannot help thinking that a man of Dr CLARKE's great parts and learning muſt have been conſcious of the weakneſs of the cauſe he was obliged to defend. If this ſhould be deemed too harſh a cenſure, I muſt juſtify myſelf for making it by the example of the gentle Mr LOCKE, who did not ſcruple to ſay of no leſs a perſon than Biſhop STILLINGFLEET, in Page 142 of his *Familiar Letters* — "All fair contenders for the "opinions they have I like mightily, but "they are ſo few that ſeem by their way of "defending them to be really perſuaded of "the opinions they profeſs, that I am apt "to think there is in the world a great deal "more ſcepticiſm than is generally imagin-"ed." And in Page 207 of thoſe *Letters* he cites and applies to the ſame Right Reverend perſon an expreſſion of Mr HOBBES; "That "were it mens intereſt to do it, they would "queſtion the truth of EUCLID's Elements." Mr LOCKE, in Page 19 of thoſe *Letters*, declares that he is fully perſuaded that there are very few things of pure ſpeculation wherein two thinking men, who impartially ſeek

truth, can differ, if they underſtand one another.

The Doctor, Page 37, enters into Mr Collins's fourth argument, which is founded on the incompatibility of human liberty with the divine preſcience, and endeavours by a diſtinction, which I can ſcarce refrain from calling a blaſphemous one, to ſhow that God only knows future events by judging of, or rather gueſſing at, them with more certainty than man does. Human perfections, of which knowledge is one, are it ſeems analogous to the divine perfections, the latter being only ſuperior to the former in degree. Thus this learned divine, after dividing human knowledge into three diſtinct ſorts, affirms that two of theſe three ſorts are the ſame in God as in man, that is to ſay the ſame in kind but different in degree; God indeed by his omnipreſence knows that there is ſuch a city as *Paris* better than, and in a different manner from, a man who has never been there; but God perceives neceſſary truths in the ſame manner that man perceives them, though more extenſively and perfectly in degree; God in like manner judges of future contingent truths more extenſively

tenſively and infallibly than man does. But this definition, or diviſion, of GOD's manner of knowing both with reſpect to the perception of neceſſary truths, and to the judging of future contingent events, is arbitrary and incapable of being proved, as GOD's manner of knowing is wholly incomprehenſible to us, and therefore the proper anſwer to theſe aſſertions is to deny their being founded in reality, or at leaſt that their being ſo is within the ſphere of our knowledge, and to call upon the Doctor for the proof thereof; ſuch proof will not be eaſily produced by the united force of metaphyſical jargon and dialectical chicane.

GOD ſeems to be, according to Dr CLARKE, nothing more than an infinite man; he perceiveth eternal relations of moral fitneſſes and unfitneſſes; he judges of them and determines his will, or his will determines itſelf, according to them; *Vide* his *Evidences of natural and revealed Religion*; all this he does in the ſame manner that man does, only infinitely better in degree; man, I ſuppoſe, by parity of reaſon, is GOD in miniature; Why indeed ſhould not this be the caſe? was not

man made in the image of GOD, and after his likeneſs?

Upon the whole, the Doctor's preſumptuous manner of analyſing his Creator, and ſplitting his incomprehenſible eſſence into a certain number of ſpecific attributes, muſt fill the mind of every ſincere theiſt with horror; and the diſtinction betwixt GOD's foreſeeing and judging of contingent truths, abſtracted from the profaneneſs and impiety of dogmatically preſcribing what is and what is not our great Creator's manner of knowing, which manner is totally incomprehenſible to us, deſerves no other anſwer than to be laughed at as a wild and chimerical aſſertion, and ſuch a one as is utterly incapable of being proved.

How much more reverently did honeſt MONTAIGNE ſpeak of GOD in his day? *Il m'a toujours ſemblé qu'à un homme Chretien cette ſorte de parler eſt pleine d'indiſcretion & d'irreverence; Dieu ne peut mourir; Dieu ne peut ſe deſdire; Dieu ne peut faire ceci ou cela. Je ne trouve pas bon d'enfermer ainſi la puiſſance divine ſous les loix de notre parole; & l'apparence qui s'offre à nous en ces propoſitions, il la faudroit repreſenter*

preſenter plus reverемment & plus religieuſement. — Or rien du notre ne ſe peut apparier ou rapporter en quelque façon que ce ſoit à la nature divine qui ne la tache & marque d'autant imperfection. Cette infinie beauté, puiſſance, & bonté, comment peut elle ſoufrir quelque correſpondence & ſimilitude à choſe ſi abjecte que nous ſommes ſans un extreme intereſt & dechet de ſa divine grandeur? Toutesfois nous luy preſcrivons des bornes, nous tenons ſa puiſſance aſſiegée par nos raiſons — nous le voulons aſſervir aux apparences vaines & foibles de notre entendement, luy qui a fait nous & noſtre connoiſſance. — Quoy Dieu nous a-t-il mis en mains les clefs & les derniers reſſorts de ſa puiſſance? Attache toy à ce à quoy tu es ſubject mais non pas luy; il n'eſt pas ton confrere, ou concitoyen, ou compagnon. S'il s'eſt aucunement communiqué a toy ce n'eſt pas pour ſe ravaler à ta petiteſſe, ni pour te donner le controlle de ſon pouvoir.

Dr CLARKE's Anſwer, Page 42, 43, 44.

" But becauſe anſwering of objections of " his own raiſing (if he were never ſo able " to do it) is nothing to the purpoſe; I ſhall " briefly draw up for him the ſum of what " has been ſaid into one objection, to which " if he can give a clear and diſtinct anſwer, " after the manner of one who ſincerely " ſeeks after the truth, and not in a looſe " ambiguous uſe of words of uncertain ſig- " nification, this whole matter may then " poſſibly deſerve to be re-conſidered." *Vide* Page 81

Anſwer to the above paragraph.

Dr CLARKE having thus drawn up the ſum of his arguments againſt Mr COLLINS into one objection, it muſt, I preſume, be ſuppoſed that this objection is the ſtrongeſt and moſt cogent that Dr CLARKE was able to bring againſt the doctrine of neceſſity. The Doctor, if I miſtake not, inſinuates that Mr COLLINS was not able to form any pertinent objection to the doctrine of human liberty; whether he did not ſpeak againſt his conſcience in this inſinuation, muſt be left the judgment of his readers: a plain man may

may be at a loſs to comprehend why Doctor CLARKE's propoſing an objection of his own raiſing to Mr COLLINS, ſhould not be as little to the purpoſe as Mr COLLINS's propoſing objections to him. I will venture, however ill qualified for ſuch an undertaking, to examine this objection, to which the Doctor very modeſtly deſires a clear and diſtinct anſwer, and proteſts againſt Mr COLLINS's making uſe of looſe and ambiguous words of uncertain ſignification.

Dr CLAKKE's objection, propoſition the firſt.

" Man either has within himſelf a prin-
" ciple of action properly ſpeaking, that is,
" a ſelf-moving faculty, a principle or power
" of beginning motion, or he has not."

Anſwer to propoſition the firſt.

In this propoſition the Doctor, I apprehend, maketh uſe of a very equivocal expreſſion himſelf, *viz.* " the power of beginning " motion *;" if he only means hereby that man

* The term ſelf-moving faculty is juſt as equivocal as the term Power of giving motion; they are uſed by the Doctor in this propoſition as ſynonymous, and are really ſo, I therefore thought it was a matter of indifference of which of them I took notice.

It

man is endued with mobility or vitality by his Creator, and accordingly is able to exert this power or faculty of ſelf-motion purſuant to the various and inſtantaneous impulſes of his will; no neceſſitarian theiſt will deny his having ſuch a principle of action, or power of beginning motion, *i. e.* a power of putting his body, or any part thereof, into any certain kind of motion, if no phyſical, that is, natural impediment intervene, his body being previous to ſuch motion in a ſuppoſed ſtate of inertneſs, or, according to the common but highly improper expreſſion, motionleſs; but the neceſſitarian theiſt denies the conſequence of man's being a free agent, as drawn from his being endued with a principle of action, or power of beginning motion in that ſenſe. Every animal is endued with a principle of action, or ſelf-moving faculty, or power of beginning motion in the ſame manner that man is, this argument therefore, notwithſtanding any metaphyſical, dialectical, quibbling diſtinctions, will juſt as well

It muſt be obſerved that the whole weight of the Doctor's objection reſts upon the equivocal terms contained in the firſt propoſition, and on the imperfect dilemma made uſe of in the third propoſition.

well prove free agency in a flea, as it will in a man. But the term power of beginning motion has another meaning, and whenever it can be made conceivable to the underſtanding of a plain man, how any created being can have ſuch a power of beginning motion, the diſpute about liberty and neceſſity will be at an end, and whatever being, man or any other, can be proved to have ſuch a power will moſt readily be allowed to be a free agent; the neceſſitarian theiſt acknowledges his utter incapacity of conceiving ſuch power in any being whatever, except in the one omnipotent firſt Cauſe*. The Doctor, I ſuppoſe, endeavours to confound the principle of ſelf-motion, *i.e.* the power man is endued with of moving his own limbs, with a principle of ſelf-motion, or power of beginning motion, taken in an abſolute ſenſe.

Dr CLARKE's ſecond propoſition.

" If he has within himſelf ſuch a princi-
" ple, then he is a free and not a neceſſary
" agent,

* I am conſcious that the term, Power of beginning motion, may ſeem improper when applied to that Being of whoſe exiſtence there is no beginning, but I know not how to expreſs myſelf better, and indeed look upon the terms — Power of beginning motion — and ſelf-exiſting — to be ſynonymous.

" agent, for every neceſſary agent is moved
" neceſſarily by ſomething elſe, and then
" that which moves it, not the thing itſelf
" which is moved, is the true and only cauſe
" of the action. That any other thing ope-
" rating upon an agent, ſhould efficiently
" and neceſſarily produce ſelf-motion in that
" agent is a contradiction in terms."

Anſwer to ſecond propoſition.

The conſequence of man's being a free agent, as drawn from his having a ſelf-moving faculty or principle, or power of beginning motion, being denied by virtue of the diſtinction applied to the Doctor's term Power of beginning motion, the remainder of this propoſition is nothing more than a kind of quibble upon the term Neceſſary agent; to cut which paltry cavil ſhort at once, I acknowledge that according to the principles of neceſſitarian theiſm, man is a meer machine, but a machine of GOD's ordination, and endued by GOD both with ſenſe and with, what we call, intellect; and farther, the neceſſitarian theiſt is fully convinced that every motion of man's body from the time of his being begot until the hour of his death, and every impulſe of his will, and every thought

thought of his mind, and every word that comes from his mouth, follow each other in a regular chain or ſucceſſion of cauſe and effect, although the immediate cauſe of ſuch motion, impulſe, thought, or word, be not always perceptible to him. The Doctor, I preſume, foreſaw that Mr COLLINS would decline giving the plain and proper anſwer to this quibble about neceſſary agency, and therefore with the uſual candor and ingenuouſneſs of a polemical divine, he ſmartly calls upon him for it in Page 7 of his Anſwer *.

Dr CLARKE's third propoſition.

" If man has not within himſelf a prin-
" ciple or power of ſelf-motion, then every
" motion and action of man is ſtrictly and
" properly produced by the efficiency of ſome
" extrinſic cauſe, which cauſe muſt be either
" what we uſually call the motive or reaſon
" upon which a man acts, or elſe it muſt
" be ſome inſenſible ſubtle matter, or ſome
" other being or ſubſtance continually mak-
" ing an impreſſion upon him."

Anſwer to third propoſition.

In this propoſition the Doctor introduces an imperfect dilemma, each part of which I reject,

* *Vide* APPENDIX, N° III.

reject, and ſay, that the immediate efficient cauſe which ſtrictly and properly produces motion and action in man, whether it be extrinſic or intrinſic, or compounded of both, is wholly unknown and incomprehenſible to every human creature.

Dr CLARKE's fourth propoſition.

" If the reaſons or motives upon which a " man acts, be the immediate and efficient " cauſe of that action, then either abſtract " notions, ſuch as all reaſons and motives " are, have a real ſubſiſtence, that is, are " themſelves ſubſtances, or elſe that which " has itſelf no real ſubſiſtence can put a body " in motion, either of which is manifeſtly " an abſurdity."

Anſwer to fourth propoſition.

The dilemma of the preceding propoſition being rejected, this propoſition requires no anſwer, at leaſt not until the validity of the dilemma contained in the former be clearly made appear.

Dr CLARKE's fifth propoſition.

" If inſenſible ſubtle matter, or any other " being or ſubſtance continually making im-

" preſſion

" preſſion upon a man, be the immediate
" and efficient cauſe of his acting, then the
" motion of that ſubtle matter muſt be cauſ-
" ed by ſome other ſubſtance, and the mo-
" tion of that by ſome other, till at laſt we
" arrive at a free agent, and then Liberty
" is a poſſible thing, and then man may
" poſſibly have liberty, and if he may poſſi-
" bly have it, then experience will prove
" that he probably, nay that he certainly,
" has it."

Anſwer to fifth propoſition.

This propoſition is a very ſurpriſing one, when conſidered as brought by a perſon of Dr CLARKE's great parts and learning; he muſt ſurely have had a very contemptible opinion of the underſtanding of his readers, if he really thought ſuch ſtuff would paſs upon them for proof. The firſt part of this propoſition depending upon the validity of the dilemma contained in the third propoſition, requires no other anſwer than that already given; but the latter part wherein the Doctor, after deducing the poſſibility of liberty from the exiſtence of a free agent ſomewhere, and from ſuch poſſible liberty the

poſſibility of man's having liberty, very roundly aſſerts that experience will prove him probably, nay certainly, to have it, is nothing more than a pitiful begging the queſtion; he well knew that the advocates for neceſſity deny that man can be proved by experience to have ſuch a liberty as renders him free from neceſſity.

Dr CLARKE's ſixth propoſition.

" If we never arrive at any free cauſe, " then there is either *in infinitum*, a progreſ- " ſion of motions without any mover, of " effects without any cauſe, of things acted " without any agent, which is a manifeſt " contradiction, or elſe motion exiſts neceſ- " ſarily of itſelf."

Dr CLARKE's ſeventh propoſition *.

" If motion exiſts neceſſarily of itſelf, it " muſt be either with a determination every " way,

* This ſeventh propoſition is juſt the ſame with Mr HOBBES's ſixth reaſon in his *Tripos*, Page 315, by which he ſhows that nothing can begin without a cauſe. I muſt however correct myſelf, for there is a very eſſential difference between them, Mr HOBBES's propoſition being very appoſite to his purpoſe, and ſtrictly relative to the

" way, or one certain way; if with a deter-
" mination every way, this is no motion at
" all; if with a determination one certain
" way, then that determination is either ne-
" ceſſary, and all other determinations im-
" poſſible, which is contrary to experience,
" or elſe there muſt be a particular reaſon
" of that determination, and ſo backwards
" *in infinitum*; which comes to the afore-
" mentioned abſurdity of effects exiſting
" without any cauſe."

Anſwer to ſixth and ſeventh propoſitions.

Theſe two propoſitions relating ſolely to atheiſm, and being totally foreign and unapplicable to the queſtion of human liberty, and being moſt probably brought in, or rather the Doctor's whole argument being formed with a view of introducing them, in order to throw an odium upon the defenders of neceſſity in general, and upon Mr COLLINS in particular, do not deſerve to have the leaſt

the queſtion he was diſcuſſing, whereas Dr CLARKE's two laſt propoſitions are nothing more than a ſorry fallacy, *i. e. fallacia plurium interrogationum.* The diſpute was concerning human liberty, and not about the exiſtence of a firſt Cauſe, the Creator and Mover of all things.

leaſt notice taken of them by a neceſſitarian theiſt; ſuch theiſt does not want the aſſiſtance of Dr CLARKE to confirm him in the belief of a firſt intelligent Cauſe of infinite power and wiſdom.

Sophiſtæ ſunt qui non indagandæ veritatis ſtudio, ſed pompæ, quæſtûs, victoriæ, litis gratiâ diſputant. ALDRICH. Logic.

CONCLUSION.

IF any expreſſion in the foregoing Rhapſodies ſhould give offence to thoſe few perſons to whoſe inſpection and judgment they will be ſubmitted, I muſt refer myſelf to Dr MIDDLETON's Preface to his *Reflections on the Diſputes betwixt St* PETER *and St* PAUL, and to what my Lord BOLINGBROKE has ſaid in two or three places of his *Philoſophical Works*, and particularly in Vol. V. Page 335, 8vo. But I muſt after all confeſs, that it is poſſible the appellations of Freethinker, Infidel, Minute Philoſopher, and even Atheiſt, ſo liberally, and the laſt ſo unjuſtly, beſtowed upon very inoffenſive perſons, may have made a ſtronger impreſſion upon my mind, than ſtrictly ſpeaking, they ought to have done.

As to the point of Man's free agency, I think that matter cannot be concluded better than by ſaying, that " whenever any learned

" Metaphyſician ſhall clearly and diſtinctly
" demonſtrate, in the manner of one who
" ſincerely ſeeks after the truth, and not in
" a looſe ambiguous uſe of words of uncer-
" tain ſignification, that Man is the efficient
" cauſe of his own volitions, or how man
" without being the efficient cauſe of his
" own volitions can be a free agent, the
" whole queſtion of Liberty and Neceſſity,
" may poſſibly, according to Dr CLARKE's
" own words, deſerve to be reconſidered."

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

N° I.

HEADS or ſketch of juſtification of aſſertions contained in Page 16, 45, *viz.* That it is the general belief of Chriſtians that all men who are not baptized are damned; and that in general each ſect of Chriſtians believes that ſalvation is only to be had within the pale of their particular church or ſect.

The eighteenth Article of the church of *England.*

Our Saviour's words as quoted in the office of Baptiſm —" None can enter into the " kingdom of GOD, except he be regenerate " and born anew of water and the Holy " Ghoſt."

In anſwer to this I have heard it ſaid, that the kingdom of GOD does not mean the kingdom of heaven; but the kingdom of GOD muſt ſurely mean the kingdom of heaven in *Mark* xiv. 25. and in *Luke* xiii. 28.

If words or ſentences may be taken in different ſenſes, or have occaſion to be expounded or explained upon account of their obſcurity, eſpecially when this happens in diſcourſes or writings deſigned for general inſtruction in matters of the utmoſt importance; I aſk, firſt, Whether ſuch equivocal expreſſion, or obſcure manner of ſpeaking or writing, be not uſually eſteemed a mark of imperfection? and I aſk, ſecondly, Whether in ſuch caſes we do not rather rely upon the authority of the explainer or expounder, than upon the authority of the ſpeaker or writer?

The Church Catechiſm ſays that there are only two Sacraments as generally neceſſary to Salvation. *Quere*, Whether the words AS GENERALLY be not a very obſcure expreſſion?

Is Baptiſm abſolutely neceſſary to become a Chriſtian, or is it not ſo?

Is

Is it not the doctrine of the church of *England*, that none but Chriſtians can be ſaved?

If men can be ſaved without being Chriſtians, what advantage have Chriſtians over the Pagan world?

Is not the ſalvation of children born of Chriſtian parents, but dying unbaptized, a diſputed point?

Is not the expreſſion — uncovenanted mercy of GOD — which I have ſometimes heard uſed with reſpect to Pagans, *&c.* and unbaptized children of Chriſtian parents, an aſſertion in the air, and unwarranted by ſacred authority?

If the doctrine of our church be, as I preſume it is, that none but Chriſtians can be ſaved, I aſk, Whether any ſociety of men can be deemed Chriſtians who have not a regular order of Prieſts among them? I do not mean a ſet of poor laymen ſhipwrecked upon a deſert iſland, but men in the circumſtances of our *Engliſh* Diſſenters.

Whether

Whether the right adminiſtration of the two Sacraments be not neceſſary to conſtitute a Chriſtian church?

Whether the Sacraments can be rightly adminiſtered without a regular order and ſucceſſion of Prieſts?

Whether ſuch order or ſucceſſion muſt not be derived from our Saviour to this time, without any interruption?

Whether the Diſſenters, Quakers, *&c.* or indeed any of the reformed churches, except the church of *England*, have ſuch a regular order or ſucceſſion, and conſequently whether they can, with propriety, be deemed Chriſtians?

But I confeſs that I am unacquainted with the ſtate of Epiſcopacy in the *Lutheran* church; neither am I acquainted with the particular tenets of the ſeveral ſects of Diſſenters in *England*, but by what I can gather in converſation I conceive that numbers of them look both upon the Romiſh church and ours to be idolatrous.

Is not the church of *Rome* idolatrous?

Are not her members idolaters?

Can idolaters enter into the kingdom of heaven?

If ſalvation can be had in the Roman Catholic church, how can ſeparation from that church be juſtified?

I am not acquainted with the articles of the *Lutheran* and *Calviniſtical* churches abroad, but by the accounts of travel-writers they hate and damn each other very cordially; both, I preſume, join in damning the Roman Catholics; who in their turn damn all except themſelves; and even in their own church all who are called *Janſeniſts*, and who are ſaid to be very numerous, are damned by thoſe who ſtile themſelves orthodox.

I ſuppoſe that the *Greek* and *Armenian* churches, and whatever other Chriſtian churches there are in the *Eaſt*, and likewiſe the *Ruſſian* church, look each upon themſelves to be the only true church of CHRIST.

Are

Are there more true churches of CHRIST than one?

Is not Unity of faith an eſſential of Chriſtianity?

Is not Hereſy a damnable ſin?

Are the preciſe bounds betwixt Hereſy and Schiſm clearly and diſtinctly aſcertained?

Whether the ſect of Independents differ in eſſentials from the church of *England* or not?

Whether the Quakers differ in eſſentials from the church of *England* or not?

Whether pure Chriſtianity, as revealed in the Goſpel, and as believed and practiſed by the church of *England*, be not tendered to the idolaters, infidels, heretics, and ſchiſmatics of *England* for their acceptance?

Whether their refuſal thereof, and continuance in ſuch their idolatry, infidelity, hereſy, and ſchiſm, muſt not be imputed to wilful obſtinacy?

Whether

Whether wilful obſtinacy in refuſing to embrace pure Chriſtianity when tendered to us for our acceptance be not a damnable ſin?

Whether a man living and dying in the wilful practice of a damnable ſin, be not certainly damned?

Our Saviour ſays, *Matthew* vii. 13, 14. *Wide is the gate and broad is the way which leadeth to deſtruction, and many there be which go in thereat; becauſe ſtrait is the gate, and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it.* Vide *Luke* xiii. 24. 2 *Eſdras* viii. 1.

I truſt it will appear from the foregoing looſe and indigeſted hints, that the ſituation of the human ſpecies, conſidered as accountable agents, and upon Chriſtian principles, affords a more gloomy and uncomfortable proſpect than that which ariſes from the ſuppoſition of their being neceſſary agents; and likewiſe that the aſſertion of Chriſtians condemning all mankind not Chriſtians, and of each ſect of Chriſtians condemning all except their

their own particular ſect, to eternal damnation, is not entirely void of foundation *. For my own part I meddle no farther in theſe matters than to diſculpate myſelf from the imputation of throwing out aſſertions at random, and to ſhow that I have ſome grounds for the foregoing ones.

N° II.

* Father RHODES, a Jeſuit, in his account of *China*, Page 46, *Paris* 1666, quarto, computes that there are, at leaſt, five millions of ſouls who go to Hell yearly, by reaſon of their dying unbaptized, out of the kingdom of *China* alone.

The *Chineſe* expoſe their children, when unwilling to bring them up, and leave them in the fields and highways; theſe children are baptized by the miſſionaries when in the agonies of death, and by ſuch baptiſm are made partakers of the kingdom of heaven, from whence without ſuch baptiſm they would have been irremediably excluded.

N° II.

Additions to Note in Page 66, or rather rough draught of ſuch.

THE more I conſider this matter, the more I ſuſpect that metaphyſicians confound and puzzle us by an imaginary diſtinction betwixt Phyſical and Moral neceſſity. Phyſical, I preſume, is in plain *Engliſh* natural; Moral is an equivocal term and has many ſignifications, and when joined to the term Neceſſity, and oppoſed to the term Phyſical, is unintelligible to me. There is a phyſical neceſſity that a piece of lead of a certain weight ſhould ſink to the bottom of a pail of water; and we know with equal certainty that motives determine a man to act, or if any learned metaphyſician likes it better, are the cauſe of the man's determining himſelf; this it ſeems is only a moral neceſſity, but why it ſhould not be as much a natural, abſolute, neceſſity as the other (although we know not the manner how motives operate upon, or produce action in, us) is what I believe

believe few men of plain underſtandings will ever comprehend. If any ſubtle metaphyſician ſhould overwhelm me with arguments drawn from the impoſſibility of abſtract notions ſuch as motives are, operating upon a material ſubſtance, I ſhould moſt readily own that I know nothing at all concerning that matter, and farther, that I have not the leaſt idea of an immaterial ſubſtance, thoſe who have ſuch an idea are endued with faculties vaſtly ſuperior to mine. There are, I conceive, two ſorts of metaphyſicians, one conſiſting of very honeſt men, ſuch as I take Mr Norris of *Bemerton* for example, and poſſiby Dr Cudworth, to have been, who impoſe upon themſelves by chimerical ideas, imaginary abſtractions, and unintelligible terms; the other ſort compoſed of men ſuperior to the former in parts, or at leaſt in cunning, whoſe ſole aim is to impoſe upon their fellow creatures, and by dialectical ſophiſtry and intricate abſtract reaſonings *à priori* to lead them to ſuch concluſions as they have thought fit to lay down for them. But to return; Moral neceſſity is, if I miſtake not, defined to be only a great difficulty, ſuch as ariſes from a long habit, a ſtrong inclination, or a violent paſſion; but moral neceſſity,

neceſſity, if ſo ſtrong as to produce action, is ſurely ſomewhat more than a great difficulty, and becomes an abſolute neceſſity. In like manner there are ſeveral degrees of thoſe difficulties which are termed Phyſical, which when arrived to a certain height, become inſurmountable.

Long habits or ſtrong inclination appear to be the ſame in a dog or a horſe, as in a man; the fear of puniſhment will ſometimes correct bad habits in theſe animals; but the habit or inclination is frequently ſo ſtrong as to be incapable of amendment, and becomes irreſiſtible.

But if I ſhould be here reproached with not conſidering the difference betwixt Matter and Spirit, and with not properly diſtinguiſhing betwixt their reſpective operations and affections, I muſt anſwer that my knowledge of the former is very imperfect, but that I have no ideas of the latter, otherwiſe than as of certain qualities, faculties, or properties, ſuch as thinking, remembering, *&c.* annexed or ſuperadded to matter by our great Creator in ſome manner wholly incom-

prehenſible to me, and that I have no reaſon to be ſurprized at my not comprehending this, as the firſt principle of vegetation in plants, and of vitality in animals, is, I preſume, alike unknown and incomprehenſible.

N° III.

Note for Page 79.

I CONFESS that Mr COLLINS in the ſecond ſection of his Preface to the *Inquiry concerning Human Liberty*, diſtinguiſhes betwixt phyſical and moral neceſſity, and ſays, That he only contends for the latter. It appears moſt probable to me, that Mr COLLINS expreſſed himſelf in this manner from prudential motives; but be that as it will, I am ſtill of opinion that man, notwithſtanding his being endued both with ſenſation and intellect, is nevertheleſs ſubject to an abſolute, mechanical, neceſſity. Man is neither a clock nor a watch, and as a creature of GOD'S is vaſtly ſuperior in the formation of his organs, and in all his faculties and powers, to the moſt ingenious and beſt contrived machine that can be put together by human art, but notwithſtanding this ſuperiority we ſhould not, methinks, be ſurprized or offended at the

the aſſertion of man's being an abſolute machine, eſpecially when the actual apparent ſtate of the human ſyſtem is appealed to for the truth of this aſſertion, if our pride would ſuffer us to reflect, that the diſtance betwixt man and the Creator of all things, is infinitely greater than that which is between a watch and a watchmaker; however, I am perſuaded that many ſhrewd arguments *à priori* would be brought againſt the truth of this laſt propoſition, which arguments it would ill become a plain man to ſpend his time in anſwering.

F I N I S.

26 ·E 60

Appendix. N°. 4.

The ambiguity of the terms contain the first proposition of Dr Clarke's objec' to mr Collins. P. 75. supra. obliges me. a kind of supplemental answer to that -jection.

Dr Clarkes objection, proposition the first.

Man either has within himself a principle of action properly speaking, that is a self moving faculty, a principle or power of beginning motion, or he has not.

Answer.

Here are three terms made use of every one of which, notwithstanding the Doctors protest against the use of ambiguous words of loose and uncertain signification, appears to me to be very ambiguous & equivocal.

ple of action properly speaking—
has, within himself if the Doctor pleases,
ciple of action, which I call vitality, and
nsequence thereof is endued by his
ator with a power of acting; but he is, say
e maintainers of necessity, necessitated to act
precisely as he does act, that is to say accor=
=ding to the last determination of his will;
whether this be or be not acting properly
speaking is nothing more than a dispute
upon words; and for my own part I acknow=
=ledge that I know not how to express my self
better than by saying that man, whom I
nevertheless allow to be an absolute machine,
acts and does. The man who shoots the pheasant,
and the dog who points it, appear to me to act
and do, or to perform the respective actions of
shooting and pointing; but whenever any
learned ~~metaphysician~~ metaphysician shall
furnish me with better and more intelligible

terms to express what I now call acting doing, I will very readily and thankfu use of them.

Self moving faculty —— This term to me, according to the natural import of the to mean that power which man has in comm with all other animals of moving his body or any part thereof in such manner as he wills or pleases, abstracted from natural impediments, and in this sense it has been already spoken to; but as this term may be supposed to mean like= =wise what is sometimes called a Self determining faculty, a power or faculty of self determination, I will now consider it in that light; and to do this in a plain and intelligible manner very few words will be necessary. If Man be free to will, or, in other words, if he be the efficient cause of his own volitions, he is to all intents and purposes a free agent, and will be allowed

defenders of necessity to have this Self
-ining faculty in as full and extended
use as their adversarys shall think—
-er to put upon it. Metaphysicians would
refore do better to furnish us with a clear
nd intelligible demonstration of mans being
the efficient cause of his own volitions, than
to perplex and puzzle us with a frivolous
quibbling dispute upon the words ACTS & DO,
or with a loose and ambiguous use of the
term—Self moving faculty.

—— Power of beginning motion —— This term
has been already, and I think sufficiently con
-sidered.

Dr Clarkes objection, proposition the second.

If he has within himself such a principle &c.

Answer.

This proposition is nothing more than a kind of
quibble upon the term Necessary Agent, which
the good Doctor is welcome to make the most of.

Dr Clarkes objection, proposition the third.

If man has not within himself &c.

Answer.

Man cannot determine himself, nor will any action without some reason or motive to determine his choice or will; his choice or will is necessarily determined by such reason or motive, and when so determined necessarily produces the action, which would not be performed if his will were not previously determined.

Dr Clarkes objection, proposition the fourth.

If the reasons or motives &c.

Answer.

Reasons or motives have not a real substance, nor is it said that they are the immediate efficient cause of the action, but the action ~~necessarily~~ ~~freely~~ follows upon Mans choice or will being determined by them. God has so formed man that his will is necessarily determined by reasons or motives, and his actions are

necessarily produced in consequence of his willing them: Of all this I have, with respect to my self, intuitive knowledge, and I am persuaded it is likewise so known by some, at least, of those who have obliged the world with the most learned and ingenious treatises in support of the contrary opinion; for which assertion, I presume, I have as good grounds as Dr Clarke &c. can be supposed to have for charging professed theists of Atheism. But how this is done, that is, how reasons or motives necessitate Will, and how thought or Will produces action, is wholly unknown and incomprehensible to me; I will however undertake to explain and demonstrate the precise and exact manner, wherein this is done, when any Professor of the occult sciences, for which expression I

have good i.e. Episcopal authority, shall clearly and intelligibly explain and demonstrate how mans immaterial substance is annexed to and contained in a material substance, and how these two substances reciprocally act upon each other.

To the Doctors fifth sixth, and seventh Propositions no further answer is, I think, necessary; I therefore rest this matter upon what has been already said.

† vid. Bishop Warburtons preface to his edition of Shakespear. P. 26